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AN OPENING FOR QUID PRO QUO CORRUPTION? 
ISSUE ADVERTISING IN WISCONSIN JUDICIAL RACES 
BEFORE AND AFTER CITIZENS UNITED
Christopher Terry* and Mitchell T. Bard** 
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Law 
In Citizens United v. FEC,1 the Supreme Court curbed the 
ability of Congress to limit campaign finance, holding that 
federal law limiting independent political expenditures by 
corporations, unions, and other organizations violated their free-
speech rights under the First Amendment. The decision marked 
a major turning point in campaign-finance law, striking down 
pieces of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002,2 and 
overturning two Supreme Court precedents.3 Citizens United
immediately set off a debate about the underlying principle at 
stake—whether money is a corrupting force in politics.4
* Ph.D., Assistant Professor, School of Journalism and Mass Communication, University 
of Minnesota.  
** Ph.D., J.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Mass Communication, Iona College. 
 1. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 2. 2 U.S.C. §441(b) (now codified as 52 U.S.C. § 30118 (2015)) [hereinafter BCRA]. 
 3. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 
U.S. 310 (2010); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), 
overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 4. President Obama predicted in his 2010 State of the Union Address that the ruling 
would “open the floodgates for special interests—including foreign corporations—to spend 
without limit in our elections,” and emphasized that “American elections” should not be 
“bankrolled by America’s most powerful interests . . . or . . . by foreign entities.” Barack 
Obama, Pres., U.S.A., State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010), available at http://www 
.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address; see also, e.g., Molly 
J. Walker Wilson, Too Much of a Good Thing: Campaign Speech after Citizens United, 31 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2365 (2010). 
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Citizens United was concerned with issue ads, which do not 
come from the candidate’s official campaign. Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion for the Court rejected the notion that campaign 
donations were potential sources of corruption in most cases. He 
noted that not only did “few if any contributions to candidates . . .
involve quid pro quo arrangements,”5 but that “independent 
expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give 
rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”6 Yet Justice 
Stevens painted a different picture in dissent, asserting that 
“[t]he Court’s ruling threatens to undermine the integrity of 
elected institutions across the Nation,”7 and that 
[t]he legislative and judicial proceedings relating to BCRA 
generated a substantial body of evidence suggesting that, as 
corporations grew more and more adept at crafting “issue 
ads” to help or harm a particular candidate, these nominally 
independent expenditures began to corrupt the political 
process in a very direct sense.8
Indeed, as he pointed out, “[t]he sponsors of these ads were 
routinely granted special access after the campaign was over.”9
Two years later, American Tradition Partnership v. 
Bullock,10 in which the Montana Supreme Court had upheld the 
state’s Corrupt Practices Act and its contribution limits,11
presented the Court with an opportunity to examine empirical 
evidence relevant to the potentially corrupting effect of 
campaign contributions. But rather than revisit Citizens United,
the Court issued a short per curiam reversal, announcing that 
“Montana’s arguments in support of the judgment below either 
 5. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357. 
 6. Id.
 7. Id. at 396. 
 8. Id. at 454–55. 
 9. Id. at 455. 
 10. ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012).  
 11. W. Tradition P’ship v. Attorney General, 271 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2011) (upholding 
Mont. Code Ann. §13-35-227(1) (2011)), rev’d sub nom. Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 
___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012); see also Anthony Johnstone, A Past and Future of 
Judicial Elections: The Case of Montana, 16 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 47, 53–58 (2015) 
(describing century-old history of corporate influence over Montana judges and judicial 
elections).
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were already rejected in Citizens United, or fail to meaningfully 
distinguish that case.”12
Taken together, these two decisions indicate that the 
Supreme Court has limited the government interest in regulating 
campaign contributions to the narrow area of “quid pro quo 
arrangements.”13 Thus, unless a donor receives an agreed-upon 
benefit in exchange for a contribution, the donation cannot be a 
corruptive influence sufficient to justify regulation of the free 
speech rights of the corporation, union, or other entity providing 
the campaign money.14
B. Previous Research 
In two earlier articles,15 the authors examined issue ads on 
Milwaukee radio stations to empirically examine whether any 
changes in the use of the ads—or in the ads themselves—were 
visible as the changes in campaign-finance law brought about by 
the BCRA and then by Citizens United began to take effect. We 
found close correlations between the changes in the law and the 
number of entities buying issue ads, the amount of money spent, 
and the number of candidate mentions made in the ads.16
But if corruption is narrowly limited to quid pro quo 
arrangements, it seems unlikely that the general spending 
examined in those two studies would persuade the Citizens
 12. Am. Tradition P’ship, 132 S. Ct. at 2491.
 13. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356–57. 
 14. See, e.g., Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign Finance Law, 101 VA. L.
REV. 1425, 1427 (2015) (pointing out both that “the Supreme Court has recently narrowed 
the definition of corruption to quid pro quo exchanges,” and that quid pro quo corruption 
does “not occur with any regularity in contemporary America”). Stephanopoulos argues 
that with the Supreme Court limiting the government’s interest in preventing corruption to 
quid pro quo arrangements, campaign-finance reform legislation must begin to rely on 
governmental interests beyond preventing corruption. He proposes use of the governmental 
interest in ensuring that public policy aligns with the wishes of the electorate. Id. at 1328 
(describing “preference alignment” and “outcome alignment,” and indicating that both 
have a “tight connection to core democratic values”). 
 15. Christopher Terry & Mitchell T. Bard, Milwaukee Radio Public File Data, 1998–
2011: An Empirical Analysis of Issue Advertising after the BCRA and Citizens United, 24 
U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 157 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 Analysis]; Christopher Terry and 
Mitchell T. Bard, Citizens United, Issue Ads, and Radio: An Empirical Analysis, 20 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 307 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 Analysis]. 
 16. 2013 Analysis, supra note 15; 2012 Analysis, supra note 15. 
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United majority that issue ads can have a corrupting effect. And, 
in fact, American Tradition indicates that it would not.17
By looking at the broad range of issue ads in a wide range 
of elections, including for president, governor, U.S. senator, and 
U.S. representative, our earlier studies examined issue ads in 
elections in which, generally, the candidates themselves raised 
substantial amounts of money. Since the federal limits on 
contributions directly to candidates were unaffected by Citizens 
United, the issue-advertisement spending made up only part of 
the larger pool of money allocated to advertising in an election. 
To empirically examine the effect of issue advertising on 
an election in which something approaching quid pro quo 
arrangements would be more of a risk, it would be necessary to 
look at races in which this type of third-party spending—freed 
by Citizens United, both in allowing unlimited spending and, as 
importantly, the naming of candidates—made up the bulk of the 
spending in a campaign. We found that scenario in judicial races 
in Wisconsin during our period of study. While the relationship 
between outside groups and candidates for judicial office is 
subject to some debate, the potential for outside groups to 
influence an election in favor of a judicial candidate that they 
perceive to be (or hope to make) friendly to their positions 
substantially increases the potential for corruption. 
A discussion of any potential corruption from campaign 
contributions has been made more urgent by McCutcheon v. 
FEC,18 in which the Court struck down ceilings under federal 
law applicable to the aggregate limits a donor can contribute to 
political candidates, political parties, and political action 
committees. Again limiting the scope of corruption to quid pro 
quo arrangements, the Court held that aggregate limits burdened 
the free-speech rights of donors without furthering the 
government interest in limiting corruption.19 For any limitation 
 17. Am. Tradition P’ship, 132 S. Ct. at 2491 (reiterating Citizens United holding that 
“political speech does not lose First Amendment protection simply because its source is a 
corporation”).
 18. 572 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). 
19. Id. at 1442 (explaining that, although limits “restrict[ing] how much money a donor 
may contribute to a particular candidate or committee” have “the permissible objective of 
combatting corruption,” limits restricting “how much money a donor may contribute in 
total to all candidates or committees . . . do little . . . to address that concern,  . . . seriously 
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on campaign finance to be upheld by the current Supreme Court, 
the government must be able to demonstrate that the law in 
question limits quid pro quo corruption. General influence of the 
type that concerned Justice Stevens20 will not suffice. 
For that reason we now move away from questions about 
the relationship between politicians and friendly outside groups 
and seek to examine the relationship between outside groups and 
judicial candidates, a relationship that should not be taken 
lightly. Research has already documented a correlation between 
donations to justices in Wisconsin and favorable rulings in favor 
of campaign supporters in more than fifty percent of cases, as 
well as the reality that Wisconsin Supreme Court justices failed 
to recuse themselves in at least ninety-eight percent of cases in 
which one or more of the participants had donated to one or 
more of the justices’ election campaigns.21 As a result, an 
empirical examination of issue ads in judicial races, where the 
potential for something approaching the quid pro quo 
benchmark for corruption is great, would provide a focused 
inquiry as to whether there are corruption risks in this setting. 
In Part II we lay out the state of the law on campaign 
finance and the legal responsibilities of radio stations. Our 
questions and method are described in Parts III and IV. Part V 
and Part VI present our results and discussion, which track how 
the judicial races in the state of Wisconsin saw an increase in 
issue-ad spending by outside groups after Citizens United, and 
address the implications of this increase. 
II. BROADCAST RADIO, ADVERTISING, AND THE LAW
A. Political Advertising: The Rules 
Political advertising in broadcasting is divided into two 
major categories. Campaign advertising—as relevant to this 
restrict[] participation in the democratic process,” and are “invalid under the First 
Amendment”).
 20. See text accompanying notes 7 & 8, supra.
 21. “In instances where a contribution came in before a case was decided, justices 
favored those attorneys’ clients 59 percent of the time.” Jake Harper, Wisconsin Supreme 
Court Justices Tend to Favor Attorney Donors, available at http://www.wisconsinwatch.org 
/2013/10/wisconsin-supreme-court-justices-tend-to-favor-attorney-donors/.
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article, advertising that originates with the official campaign of a 
legally qualified candidate for state office—is governed by the 
Communications Act of 1934, which requires broadcasters to 
provide equal access to advertising by opposing candidates, and 
to make candidates’ ads available at the lowest price charged to 
commercial customers.22 The second category of political 
advertising—non-candidate political advertising (generically 
referred to as “issue ads”)—covers advertising that discusses a 
political issue but does not originate with the official campaign 
of a candidate for office. Issue ads are not given the same access 
and rate protections as campaign ads under federal law. Radio 
stations are not required to sell these ads, but a station accepting 
them is legally responsible for preserving the content of the ads 
that it sells and then clears.23
Assuming that a broadcast radio or television station is 
willing to sell issue advertising, it will typically make a decision 
to carry issue ads at a pre-specified rate, and will then publish a 
rate card that identifies the prices for issue-advertising sales.24
This information will be available, along with a list of 
advertisers buying issue ads, in the station’s public file.25
Licensed broadcast stations are required to keep information on 
 22. 47 U.S.C. §315 (addressing duties and obligations of radio stations in connection 
with “candidates for public office”); cf. 47 U.S.C. § 312(7) (authorizing imposition of 
penalties on station willfully failing to offer access to, or to sell air time at a reasonable rate 
to, a “legally qualified candidate for Federal elective office”). Only the requirements of 
section 315 are applicable to Wisconsin Supreme Court campaigns. 
 23. 47 C.F.R. 73-1943(c) (requiring immediate placement of records into public file, 
and retention of those records for two years). 
 24. The rate card is a media outlet’s “menu” for purchasers of advertising. A broadcast 
station will usually maintain a special rate card for issue advertising during election cycles, 
which will then be part of the station’s public file. Rate cards may include the price of ads 
at different times of day, and for different days of the week, as well as any discounts for 
frequency, and rules for pre-emption. (Ads subject to pre-emption are typically cheaper, 
because they can be set aside in favor of more expensive ads sold to run in the same time 
slot; the pre-empted ads will be aired only after the term of the other—more profitable to 
the station—ad buy is over.) Rate cards will also specify whether a station will accept issue 
ads, as well as the guidelines that the station uses when accepting issue ads.  
 25. 47 C.F.R. § 73-1943 (requiring every station to keep a “political file” in its public 
file that contains “all requests for broadcast time made by or on behalf of a candidate for 
public office, together with an appropriate notation showing the disposition made by the 
licensee of such requests, and the charges made, if any, if the request is granted”). In this 
context, “disposition” includes “the schedule of time purchased, when spots actually aired, 
the rates charged, and the classes of time purchased.” Id. Each of the six radio stations 
included in this study had a published rate card available in its public file. 
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all political advertising on file for a period of two years.26
Stations typically keep this information—which is likely to  
contain pricing information for all parts of the day, some of 
which are more expensive than others—in their public files for 
no longer than the required two-year period.27
Federal law relating to the airing of issue ads has changed 
back and forth in the last two decades, as the BCRA added 
additional limitations on this kind of spending that Citizens 
United then removed. One invalidated provision, the prohibition 
on “electioneering communications” made shortly before an 
election,28 was in fact at the heart of Citizens United: Citizens 
United wanted to advertise and to release Hillary: The Movie, a 
documentary critical of then-senator and presidential candidate 
Hillary Clinton, within thirty days of a primary election. It 
sought a preliminary injunction against the FEC’s applying the 
BCRA to television ads promoting the video and its release, 
arguing that the FEC’s application of the provision to the ads 
would be unconstitutional.29 The trial court granted the FEC’s 
motion for summary judgment, holding the electioneering 
provisions of the BCRA constitutional in light of McConnell.30
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court asked the parties to re-
argue and re-brief the issue of whether its earlier precedents 
should be overruled,31 and then reversed, holding the spending 
provisions of the BCRA unconstitutional.32
 26. 47 C.F.R. § 73-3526(e)(6). 
 27. A station will routinely purge political material from its public files because the 
pricing-structure information that it contains can be valuable both to competing stations 
and to ad buyers who think that the station may offer lower prices to other advertisers. 
 28. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3)(A)(i) (prohibiting issue ads from identifying federal 
candidates if broadcast within thirty days of a primary contest or sixty days of a general 
election).
 29. Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 277 (D. D.C. 2008) (noting Citizens 
United’s claims that the relevant provisions of the BCRA were facially unconstitutional 
and would be unconstitutional infringements of its First Amendment rights if applied to the 
Clinton video). 
 30. Id. at 278–80. The BCRA’s restrictions on electioneering had already been limited 
in Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC, 551 U.S. 449 (2007) (holding that, to be considered 
electioneering subject to the BCRA’s ban on mentioning candidates within the specified 
periods, an ad must not be subject to being construed as anything but an appeal for or 
against the election of a specific candidate, and that its merely mentioning a candidate 
would not trigger the provision). 
 31. Citizens United v. FEC, 557 U.S. 932 (2009) (restoring case to argument calendar). 
The Court eventually rejected the FEC’s claim that re-argument was improper, noting that 
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B. Political Advertising on the Radio 
Radio and television broadcasters are required by law to 
maintain political advertising information in their public files.33
Even though these data are relatively easy to access, as they are 
available to any member of the public willing to go to a station 
and make a request,34 these public files are notoriously hard to 
navigate without industry knowledge and/or some previous 
experience with the materials in them. Historically, interest in 
the files has been quite limited, and with much of the focus on 
television commercials,35 the political advertising on broadcast 
radio has gone largely ignored.36
We believe this lack of focus on radio advertising to be an 
important oversight. Radio has a powerful ability to target very 
specific demographic groups at the local level. Thus, examining 
radio can reveal the strategies behind political spending in a way 
that an examination of television, with the mass-appeal approach 
of its programming, cannot. Radio is a major source through 
which citizens access political information, and remains an 
important contributor to political speech.37 Still available 
through traditional means, but now also available via digital 
streaming, radio has become an increasingly popular choice for 
consumers—and thus advertisers—in part because of the ability 
for people to multitask while listening.38 In fact, $124 million 
Citizens United had consistently asserted a violation of its First Amendment rights. 
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 330–31. 
 32. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 372 (declaring BCRA’s “restrictions on corporate 
independent expenditures” unconstitutional, but upholding its “disclaimer and disclosure 
requirements”).
 33. 47 C.F.R. § 73-3527. 
 34. 47 C.F.R. § 73-3527(c)(1). 
 35. See generally, e.g., ALICIA BANNON, ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL 
ELECTIONS, 2011–12: HOW NEW WAVES OF SPECIAL INTEREST SPENDING RAISED THE 
STAKES FOR FAIR COURTS, available at http://newpoliticsreport.org/media/JAS-New 
Politics2012-Online.pdf (including extensive discussion of television advertising in judicial 
races).
 36. 2012 Analysis, supra note 15; 2013 Analysis, supra note 15. 
 37. One study indicated that in 2008, approximately sixty percent of news and talk 
radio content was about politics and the election. The State of the News Media—Radio,
PEW PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM, available at http://stateofthemedia.org/ 
2009/a-year-in-the-news/radio/.
 38. See, e.g., Laura Santhanam, Amy Mitchell & Kenny Olmstead, The State of the 
News Media—Audio: Digital Drives Listener Experience, PEW PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE 
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was invested in election advertising on AM and FM radio 
stations in the 2012 election cycle.39 Our previous research has 
demonstrated that radio has been a major recipient of spending 
on political races as an increasing number of outside groups 
become involved in political advertising.40 The earlier analysis 
also demonstrated changes in the content of ads, and the number 
of ads which mention a candidate by name.41
With all of this in mind, we turned our attention to issue 
ads related to judicial races and candidates on broadcast radio in 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, between 1998 and 2013. 
III. THE RESEARCH PLAN
Citizens United made assumptions about the effects of 
corporate money (on corruption, influence, and advertising) 
without considering empirical evidence. The Court then declined 
in American Tradition to consider the Montana campaign-
finance statute, which would have included analysis of historical 
and empirical data on the effects of corporate political spending 
in that state.42
We continue to believe that ignoring empirical evidence is 
a mistake, no matter where the data might lead. And with two 
statewide judicial elections in Wisconsin since Citizens United,
it is possible to directly test the case’s impact on spending in 
judicial elections by comparing the spending on issue ads in 
those elections to the spending in previous judicial races. We do 
just that by analyzing the use of radio in Wisconsin’s largest 
media market—Milwaukee—through a unique fifteen-year 
sample of public-file data from six co-owned Milwaukee radio 
stations.
In light of the restrictions first placed on corporations, 
unions, and other organizations by the BCRA and then partially 
removed by Citizens United, we expected to find changes in 
IN JOURNALISM, available at http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2013/audio-digital-drives- 
listener-experience/. 
 39. Id.
 40. 2012 Analysis, supra note 15; 2013 Analysis, supra note 15. 
 41. 2012 Analysis, supra note 15; 2013 Analysis, supra note 15. 
 42. American Tradition was resolved in a per curiam opinion issued concurrently with 
the denial of certiorari. American Tradition, 132 S. Ct. at 2491. 
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advertising behavior correlated with these changes in the law. 
Specifically, we were interested in the number of issue ads 
related to the judicial elections in each year between 1998 and 
2013; the number of those ads that mentioned a candidate in the 
judicial election; whether those mentions are related to a 
positive endorsement or negative attack; and the amounts spent 
on advertising of this type. We expected to see increases in the 
number of groups running ads, the dollars spent on those ads, 
and candidate mentions in the judicial elections following 
Citizens United.
During the study period, individual justices of the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court were chosen in statewide elections 
eleven times, in nine races before Citizens United (1998, 1999, 
2001 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009), and two that 
followed the decision (2011 and 2013). Because our data set43
includes issue advertising from election years that preceded the 
BCRA, our analysis examines three periods of advertising 
regulation: the pre-BCRA era, the BCRA era, and the post-
Citizens United era. 
IV. THE UNEXPECTED ARCHIVE
During our earlier research, we had been able to obtain 
access to archived public-file data for the four-year period 
between 2006 and 2010.44 Initially, our focus was to compare 
data from even-numbered years during this time, contrasting 
empirical evidence of issue-advertising buys from 2008 (pre-
Citizens United) and 2010 (post-Citizens United).45 During our 
search of the stations’ public-file records, however, we located 
several additional boxes filled with archival public-file 
records.46 We approached the management of the cluster of six 
Milwaukee radio stations a second time and secured permission 
 43. Christopher Terry & Mitchell T. Bard, Terry-Bard Political Advertising Database 
(2013) (unpublished data compilation) (on file with Dr. Terry). 
 44. 2012 Analysis, supra note 15. 
 45. Id.
 46. Because the BCRA requires stations to retain information for only two years, most 
stations discard outdated files. These old boxes were retained only because they were so 
heavy that no one had wanted to carry them out for disposal. That historical accident led to 
our important find. 
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to examine the entire archive of public-file data, including any 
outdated files still intact. Our lengthy review of these additional 
boxes unearthed a complete archive of public-file data stretching 
back to 1998. 
After substantial work in the archive, we were able to 
collect all of the files on issue ads between 1998 and 2010.47
The archive contained out-of-date station rate cards, internal 
memos on company procedures for handling issue ads, National 
Association of Broadcasters disclosure forms, scripts for many 
of the ads, and copies of the checks used to pay for some ads. 
The sample also included copies of all of the invoices, providing 
details on the number of ads purchased, the amounts paid for ad 
buys, and station logs that indicated when spots were actually 
aired.48 Data from 2010 to 2013 were collected from the existing 
public file and added to the original database that we first 
assembled in connection with our earlier research.49
To our knowledge, no other archive of this kind, with its 
breadth (six stations) and depth (all of the records for each 
advertisement) exists. Since FCC regulations require stations to 
retain records for only two years, in most cases it would be 
necessary for a researcher to collect data at least every two years 
beginning in 1998 to amass an archive like this one. Further, the 
six stations from which data were obtained provide a 
representative sample of the thirty-six commercial radio stations 
in Milwaukee.50 Of the six stations covered, two are AM and 
four are FM, and they cover a range of programming types 
(music, sports, and news/talk formats), which bring with them a 
 47. 2013 Analysis, supra note 15. Citizens United did not affect the longstanding 
regulation of on-air political advertising by candidates, so our focus remains on issue ads. 
 48. Sales records discovered in the archive were tested against the advertising files we 
collected, demonstrating that the older information remained intact. We believe in 
consequence that our data accurately represent the issue advertising that appeared on the 
six radio stations for the earlier years reported in this study. 
 49. See 2013 Analysis, supra note 15; 2012 Analysis, supra note 15. The data in the 
archive we have now assembled represent issue advertising during a span of fifteen years 
and includes purchases by 141 groups, political parties, or individuals, covering 17,468 
individual issue ads and more than $2,500,000 in spending. 
 50. Milwaukee-Racine was in 2012 the thirty-eighth largest media market in the 
country, serving 1,481,300 people. Market Survey Schedule & Population Rankings,
ARBITRON (Fall 2012), http://www.arbitron.com/downloads/fa12_market_survey_schedule 
_poprankings.pdf. 
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diverse group of target demographics.51 In the summer of 2001, 
the six stations were united under Clear Channel ownership, but 
when the period of study began, the stations had three different 
owners.
Once the issue ads in the archive were sorted and checked 
for accuracy based on the internal records, the study involved 
logging the ads, organizing them by year, calculating the 
number and amount of spending, and also noting when a 
candidate was mentioned by name; this archival information was 
then combined with campaign data we collected from current 
files.52 As mentioned above, once the archive was compiled in 
2012, we continued to collect campaign data each year, 
expanding the data set available for review. This study zeroes in 
on the eleven Supreme Court races in Wisconsin between 1998 
and 2013.53
V. RESULTS
Although our earlier research turned up issue ads in almost 
every year of the study period, the participation of outside 
groups buying issue advertising in judicial races is relatively 
new in Milwaukee. We were surprised to make this discovery.54
Prior to Citizens United, the only issue ads mentioning a 
judicial candidate at any level between 1998 and 2009 were a 
series of spots run in 2006 by Focus on the Family encouraging 
people to support confirmation of Justice Samuel Alito to the 
United States Supreme Court. The archive includes entries for 
 51. The six stations are WISN-AM (news/talk), WKKV-FM (rap/hip-hop), WMIL-FM 
(country), WRIT-FM (oldies), WRNW (Top 40/CHR) and WOKY (classic country and 
other formats). During the fifteen-year period for which the public-file records were 
available, WRIT maintained the call letters WZTR-FM and WRNW was at times identified 
as WQBW (classic rock) and WLTQ (soft rock). WOKY also changed formats three times 
during the study period (from nostalgia to oldies to classic country before becoming a 
sports-talk oriented station). 
 52. See note 43, supra, and accompanying text.  
 53. The 2015 election for associate justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court came after 
the study, and data relating to that race are not included here. 
 54. Although most of the data for this project were part of our database before we 
began this investigation, we had been focused on evaluating the macro-level changes 
before and after Citizens United. Our micro-level analysis of issue spending in judicial 
elections was developed as a research question in response to the high volumes of issue ads 
about judicial candidates that ran during 2011 and 2013. 
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candidate advertising in several judicial elections—at both the 
local and state levels—but the public-file data suggest that issue 
groups become involved in judicial elections only after the 
changes to the advertising regulations implemented by the 
BCRA were repealed by Citizens United.55 The removal by 
Citizens United of the limits on when issue ads could mention 
candidates by name seems to have played a significant role in 
introducing third-party ads to judicial races. In fact, the 2011 
and 2013 elections were the only races in our period of study 
that featured issue ads on the studied radio stations, and both 
came after Citizens United, which allowed third-party 
expenditures and references to candidates’ names in the period 
leading up to the election. 
The first statewide judicial election in Wisconsin after 
Citizens United was a spring 2011 race between incumbent 
conservative David Prosser and his liberal challenger Joanne 
Kloppenburg. Although judicial races are nonpartisan in 
Wisconsin, the Prosser-Kloppenburg race was widely seen as a 
proxy for the ongoing debate over Governor Scott Walker’s 
controversial legislation limiting the role of unions for most 
state employees.56 The Wisconsin Club for Growth, a GOP-
supporting issue- and industry-lobby group, purchased 188 radio 
ads attacking Kloppenburg on the stations covered by the study. 
A second issue group, We Are Wisconsin, purchased and ran 
four ads in support of Kloppenburg’s candidacy on those 
stations.
In 2013, a Wisconsin Supreme Court race and a local 
judicial race each attracted issue-group advertising, with a total 
of 369 issue ads appearing on five of the six stations covered by 
the study. Two advertisers representing industry-lobby groups, 
the Wisconsin Club for Growth and the Wisconsin Realtors 
Political Fund, ran a total of 214 issue ads directly attacking the 
perceived liberal candidate for the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 
Marquette University Law Professor Ed Fallone, and supporting 
 55. A check of the data we used for other in-market stations in our study of issue 
advertising changes between 2006 and 2010 also supports the finding that outside groups 
were not purchasing issue ads for judicial elections prior to Citizens United. 2013 Analysis,
supra note 15.  
 56. See, e.g., Monica Davey, Wisconsin Election is Referendum on Governor, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 4, 2011, at A13. 
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the conservative incumbent, Justice Patience Roggensack.57 We 
Are Wisconsin, a group affiliated with labor interests, purchased 
thirty-nine additional ads advocating Fallone’s election.
VI. DISCUSSION
There can no longer be a debate about the nature of the 
changes to issue advertising in the wake of Citizens United.
Increases in the number of groups and the amount of spending, 
and the increasingly negative nature of the mentions of political 
candidates have all been documented.58 Two changes—the 
increase in the number of issue ads, and the increase in issue ads 
that mention candidates by name—are especially important 
given the Supreme Court’s striking down the aggregate limits on 
political spending.59 Simply put, the repeal of the BCRA’s 
electioneering communication standard in Citizens United has 
changed the nature of political advertising. 
Direct contributions to judicial candidates have already 
been demonstrated to be correlated with favorable rulings.60
Spending on behalf of candidates, especially in low-turnout 
elections like statewide judicial races, is potentially more 
effective than contributions made directly to candidates. 
Although the Supreme Court declined in American Tradition to 
address the empirical data on the effect of Citizens United,61 the 
Court may eventually have to address the evidence of favorable 
rulings. It may in some cases point to the kind of quid pro quo 
corruption that Citizens United deems an appropriate ground for 
 57. In addition, the Wisconsin Club for Growth spent more than $29,000 on four 
individual ad buys for 136 individual ads supporting Rebecca Bradley’s 2013 campaign for 
a Milwaukee County Circuit Court judgeship to which she had been appointed by 
Governor Walker in 2012. Terry & Bard, supra note 43 (collecting ad-purchase data). She 
won that election, and was later appointed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court by the 
governor. See, e.g., Justice Rebecca G. Bradley, WISCONSIN COURT SYSTEM—WISCONSIN
SUPREME COURT, http://wicourts.gov/courts/supreme/justices/rbradley.htm (summarizing 
Justice Bradley’s professional biography). 
 58. See, e.g., 2013 Analysis, supra note 15. 
 59. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434. 
 60. Harper, supra note 21. 
 61. Am. Tradition P’ship, 132 S. Ct. at 2491 (opining that “Montana’s arguments in 
support of the judgment below either were already rejected in Citizens United, or fail to 
meaningfully distinguish that case”). 
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limiting the free-speech rights of those seeking to spend on 
political advertising. 
This study demonstrates that Citizens United appears to 
have had a powerful effect on advertising in judicial races in 
Wisconsin, opening the door for third-party groups to make 
significant investments in ads attacking one candidate, 
supporting another, or both. And the success of issue ads like 
these can prompt judges to be friendly to those who buy them.62
Judicial elections—which the Court did not distinguish 
from political elections in Citizens United—are especially 
vulnerable to the influences of third-party financing. Industry 
groups, for example, can support anti-regulation candidates for 
the bench, spending unlimited amounts of money to advertise on 
their behalf. With Wisconsin Supreme Court justices often 
unwilling to recuse themselves,63 corporations, unions, and other 
groups aware that issues in which they are interested will end up 
before the Wisconsin Supreme Court could view spending 
money on issue advertising as a practical, effective investment 
in influencing a candidate to rule in their favor. 
The data in this study, much as in our earlier research, 
demonstrate the correlation between the change in campaign-
finance law (in this case, before and after Citizens United) and 
changes in the patterns of issue advertising on Milwaukee radio. 
For more than a decade before Citizens United, there was no 
issue advertising for Wisconsin judicial candidates at any level. 
Not a single judicial-election ad was purchased or run, not even 
on the conservative-leaning talk radio station that was attracting 
issue ads in connection with political candidates, before, during 
and after the BCRA was in place, and both before and after the 
Court limited the BCRA’s reach in Citizens United.64
The first statewide judicial race after Citizens United was in 
2011, and it is not surprising to see that outside groups were 
already participating in judicial races. It bears noting, however, 
that 2011 was an unusually combative year in Wisconsin 
politics. Although an off year for national elections, 2011 was 
 62. Harper, supra note 21.
 63. Id.
 64. During the study period more than thirty-six percent of all issue ads ran on WISN-
AM, the conservative talk station, and more than forty percent of issue-ad spending in the 
six-station cluster went to WISN. 2013 Analysis, supra note 15. 
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marked in Wisconsin by several recalls and the Supreme Court 
race, and without the issue advertising brought about by Citizens
United, interested parties would not have been able to act on 
their passion in the same ways. No matter how much of an 
outlier it might be in Wisconsin political history, 2011 has to be 
examined through the prism of the changes in federal campaign-
finance law. Issue advertising exploded in that first full year 
after Citizens United, when 202 issue ads relating to the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court election were run, after more than a 
decade of no issue ads being run in this type of election. 
Notably, the Supreme Court race represented sixteen percent of 
the total number of issue ads that ran in 2011 on the six stations 
in the cluster.65 Without the changes in the law brought about by 
Citizens United, many of the issue ads that ran in 2011 
(including all of the ads directed to the election for the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court and other judicial races) would not 
have been permissible under federal law and station policies. 
The data on issue advertising in 2013 present an even 
stronger illustration of the effect of Citizens United on the 
Wisconsin judicial elections. While the quantity of issue 
advertising in 2011 can be at least partially attributed to the 
high-stakes political climate in Wisconsin that year, 2013 offers 
no such alternative explanations. In 2013, issue advertising 
relating to the Wisconsin Supreme Court election represented all 
of the issue advertising through October across the six diverse 
radio stations studied. 
In fact, in 2013 there was more advertising by issue groups 
than by both of the candidates combined.66 The media debate 
(which looms large in shaping the overall debate in an election) 
in the 2013 election for the Wisconsin Supreme Court was not 
primarily set by the candidates, but was in the hands of outside 
groups. And, in most cases, these outside groups had interests 
likely to come before the court.67 The potential for quid pro quo 
 65. See Terry & Bard, supra note 43 (containing data from which percentage was 
calculated).
 66. Id.
 67. Compare id. (containing data about ad purchases by entities like Wisconsin Club 
for Growth in connection with Wisconsin Supreme Court elections) with, e.g., Dee J. Hall,
Justices Face Questions as “John Doe” Probe Lands in Supreme Court, WIS. ST. J., 
October 6, 2014, available at http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/ 
politics/justices-face-questions-as-john-doe-probe-lands-in-supreme/article_b082257c-3b2 
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corruption in this arrangement is clear, especially as the justices 
of the Wisconsin Supreme Court are not required to recuse 
themselves from cases in which campaign donors appear before 
them.68
The most direct example of a potential quid pro quo 
involves the John Doe investigation of illegal campaign 
coordination during Governor Scott Walker’s recall election.69
Groups like Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce, the 
Wisconsin Club for Growth, and Citizens for Responsible 
Government each spent significant amounts of money on issue 
advertising during both political and judicial elections in 
Wisconsin and then instituted a series of actions intended to halt 
the investigation of their allegedly illegal campaign activities.70
Collectively, these three groups spent more than $8,000,000 in 
support of candidates for the Wisconsin Supreme Court,71 which 
eventually held that their activities were not barred by the 
Wisconsin statute that prohibits coordination between 
candidates’ campaigns and outside groups.72
d-5ac9-b7ee-63bc64286beb.html (featuring chart that shows “money spent in support of 
candidates” that traces contributions from entities including Wisconsin Club for Growth to 
Supreme Court candidates Ziegler, Gableman, Prosser, and Roggensack, and reporting that 
those groups had spent “millions” in support of their candidacies).  
 68. Harper, supra note 21 (asserting that the Wisconsin Supreme Court enacted recusal 
rules “written by lobbying groups Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce and the 
Wisconsin Realtors Association stating that ‘the receipt of a lawful campaign contribution 
shall not, by itself, warrant judicial recusal.’”); see also Wis. S. Ct. R. 60.04(1)(g)(7) 
(providing that “[a] judge shall not be required to recuse himself or herself in a proceeding 
based solely on . . . the judge’s campaign committee’s receipt of a lawful campaign 
contribution, including a campaign contribution from an individual or entity involved in the 
proceeding”).
 69.  See, e.g., Hall, supra note 67 (pointing out that “[t]hree groups that have fought in 
court to end the John Doe probe—Wisconsin Club for Growth, Citizens for a Strong 
America, and Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce—also have spent millions to 
support the candidacies of Justices David Prosser, Pat Roggensack, Annette Ziegler and 
Michael Gableman over the past seven years”). 
 70. See State v. Peterson, 866 N.W.2d 165 (Wis. 2015). 
 71. Spending for Supreme Court Justices, MADISON.COM (Oct. 3, 2014), http://host 
.madison.com/spending-for-supreme-court-justices/pdf_0ce418a7-6064-5c77-a5be-7188f5 
c93e3c.html (noting that Wisconsin Club for Growth, Citizens for a Strong America, and 
Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce, then “before the Supreme Court challenging the 
legality of the ‘John Doe’ investigation,” had “spent heavily . . . to elect the court’s four-
member conservative majority,”  but had “spent no money boosting the candidacies of the 
other three justices”). 
 72. Peterson, 866 N.W.2d at 179 (holding that “the definition of ‘political purposes’ in 
Wis. Stat. § 11.01(16) is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague under the First 
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We are not suggesting that Citizens United turned judicial 
races in Wisconsin negative. To do so would ignore the reality 
of the 2008 race between incumbent Louis Butler and challenger 
Michael Gableman, in which a misleading ad run by 
Gableman’s campaign ultimately led the state Judicial 
Commission to file a formal ethics complaint against Gableman 
after he joined the Court.73 Candidates who run improper ads 
can be held accountable.74 But as the 2013 election for the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court demonstrates, candidates are not held 
responsible for issue ads run by third-party advertisers. 
While the nature of the study makes it impossible to isolate 
a causal effect between the development of campaign-finance 
law and the changes in issue advertising at Milwaukee radio 
stations, the correlation between the two factors is worthy of 
attention and consideration. Issue advertising was essentially 
nonexistent in Wisconsin judicial elections prior to Citizens
United. The growth in outside spending on judicial elections 
since Citizens United is especially concerning because issue 
advertising by third parties in recent Wisconsin Supreme Court 
elections has outpaced spending by the candidates themselves. 
The data we present in this study suggest that radio was—
and continues to be—used by outside groups to broadcast 
political messages to specific demographic groups at the local 
level. This is not a surprising finding, as niche targeting is one of 
radio’s strengths as an advertising medium. But the apparent 
effect that the changes in federal campaign-finance law have had 
on issue-ad campaigns in judicial races in which the candidates 
did not spend as much as outside groups is telling. If Citizens
United recognizes only quid pro quo corruption as a legitimate 
basis for regulating political spending, the changes in issue 
advertising on Milwaukee radio after Citizens United are worthy 
of the United States Supreme Court’s attention. 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 3 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution”). 
 73. See, e.g., Patrick Marley & Steven Walters, Judicial Commission Says Gableman 
Ad Was Deceiving, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL (Oct. 8, 2008), http://www.jsonline 
.com/news/statepolitics/32440994.html. 
 74. See, e.g., id. (reporting that “[i]f Gableman is found to have violated the [judicial 
ethics] code, his colleagues on the court could reprimand him, censure him, suspend him or 
force him off the high court”). 
